| INTRODUCTION
Organ allocation in the United States is governed by policies de- The 11 OPTN regio ns are broader geographic areas designated by OPTN to administer OPTN operations. 3 Importantly, neither geographic entity was designed to optimize organ allocation or distribution.
Lung and heart allocation policies use concentric circles of increasing radius from the donor's location to prioritize candidates closer to the donor. DSAs, OPTN regions, and concentric circles all have defined geographic borders. Thus, two candidates in close geographic proximity may be given very different allocation priorities simply because one is located across a geographic border.
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The Final Rule mandates that organ allocation not be based on the transplant candi- 2. Shall seek to achieve the best use of donated organs;
3.
Shall preserve the ability of a transplant program to decline an offer of an organ or not to use the organ for the potential recipient in accordance with §121.7(b)(4)(d) and (e); 4. Shall be specific for each organ type or combination of organ types to be transplanted into a transplant candidate; 5. Shall be designed to avoid wasting organs, to avoid futile transplants, to promote patient access to transplantation, and to promote the efficient management of organ placement; 
| LEGAL CHALLENGES TO CURRENT ALLOCATION POLICIES
In November 2017, a lawsuit challenged use of DSAs to distribute lungs in the United States. 6 In response, OPTN revised its lung distribution policies, replacing DSAs with a 250-mile-radius circle extending from the donor hospital. 7 Following this emergency change to lung allocation policy, the OPTN Board of Directors created an Ad Hoc Committee on Geography, which established guiding principles for handling geo- Of the three frameworks advanced by the Geography Committee, concentric circles are used in existing policy (eg heart and lung allocation). Mathematically optimized regions were explored in detail during recent policy debates regarding liver allocation, but were not implemented. [8] [9] [10] [11] Although the concept of a borderless system is not new, 12 we aim to describe it in detail to educate the community regarding how such a system could be developed.
| FEASIBILITY OF A BORDERLESS SYSTEM TO DISTRIBUTE ORGANS
The Final Rule requires an inherent compromise between medical priority and geographic feasibility, which can be operationalized by designing a system to prioritize allocation using: (a) a medical priority score, and (b) a geographic feasibility score. 
| Medical priority score

| Geographic feasibility score
The Final Rule stipulates that organs should be shared as broadly as feasible. However, logistical and practical constraints limit sharing all donor organs nationally. Ischemia time incurred during organ transport impairs outcomes after transplant. Additionally, greater costs are incurred when organs travel longer distances to reach patients with the highest medical priority scores. Organs may pass each other in route to meet small differences in medical priority. Finally, some donor organs may be more suitable for transport than others, based on organ type and susceptibility to ischemia from, for example, donation after circulatory death (DCD) versus donation after brain death (DBD) donors. The
Final Rule allows limitations on broader sharing based on sound medical judgment to promote the best use of donated organs, avoid wasting organs and futile transplants, and promote access and efficiency. The geographic feasibility score can be designed to quantify "feasibility."
Combining the two scores will allow each organ to reach the candidate with the highest medical priority score allowed by the constraints of the geographic feasibility score. The geographic feasibility score can be based on distance, travel time, costs, logistics, and donor factors.
| ALLOCATION BY COMBINING MEDICAL PRIORITY AND GEOGRAPHIC FEASIBILITY SCORES
A medical priority score and a geographic feasibility score can be combined to yield an allocation score to prioritize organ offers. For example, for adult liver candidates, the medical priority score is determined by MELD combined with exception points; candidates who most urgently need transplant are prioritized above MELD and exception candidates as Status 1A. This constitutes the basic framework of a medical priority score. The geographic feasibility score can then quantify the feasibility of distance and travel-related constraints. Simply stated, the geographic feasibility score will be a function that assigns higher points to candidates near the donor and lower points to candidates farther away, accounting for the implications of distance for the transplant's outcomes.
The process can be illustrated using the metaphor of a hill sloping away from the donor's location (Figure 1 ). Liver candidates, for example, are positioned on this hill at the location determined by distance and its constraints in a geographic feasibility score. Additionally, each candidate stands next to a flagpole. The flag's height is determined by the candidate's medical priority score; ie, candidates with higher allocation MELD scores or Status 1A have higher flags. Offers will be made first to the candidate with the highest flag relative to the donor, the second-highest flag next, and so forth. In this way a medical priority score and a geographic feasibility score can be combined mathematically to yield the allocation priority score. The specific weighting of the medical priority score against the geographic feasibility score will be determined based on the scale used for the medical priority score; eg, a 1-point difference in MELD is equivalent to an X-point difference in the geographic feasibility score.
The shape of the geographic feasibility score function, ie, the shape of the hill, is a mathematical representation of the value system that the transplant community espouses for allocating organs.
Thus, the function can be shaped to define how much farther we are willing to ship an organ to a sicker patient. How much sicker must that patient be to justify shipping the organ that much farther?
The geographic feasibility score function could look like the function shown in Figure 2 . This function has three zones: zone A is relatively near the donor, zone B is somewhere between "near" and "too far," and zone C is "likely too far."
| Zone A (nearest the donor)
A zone likely exists relatively close to the donor where travel is not the primary factor causing ischemic damage or increased costs, perhaps where organs are driven from the donor hospital to the candidate 
| Zone B (neither near nor too far)
In this zone, organs are likely flown from the donor hospital to the recipient hospital, and ischemic time and other logistical constraints reduce the feasibility of the transplant. The shape of the feasibility score function could be determined by numerous factors, eg, the relationship between ischemia time and patient outcomes such that the function becomes steeper at distances where the ischemic effect becomes more pronounced. The slope/shape of the function could also be influenced by donor factors; eg, high kidney donor profile index kidneys may be more susceptible to travel times. Regardless of the shape of the function, in the absence of vertical drops or "cliffs," there will be no geographic boundaries and candidates near each other with similar medical priority scores will have similar allocation priority.
| Zone C (likely too far)
The transplant community would agree that organs should generally not be shipped to this region due to concerns about patient outcomes and wasted organs. It may be denoted by a vertical drop in the feasibility function, or a "cliff" on the hill. The cliff would be tall enough to prioritize all candidates nearer to the donor before organs are offered to candidates past the cliff. A system with no cliffs would be truly borderless, but a cliff may be justified to quantify a zone of infeasibility.
The challenge of the geographic feasibility score is designing the shape of the function, ie, the shape of the hill, which need not be The other framework advanced by the Geography Committee uses mathematically optimized distribution zones designed to equalize access to transplant across the country as measured by a disparity metric, as discussed next.
| PROMOTING EQUITY IN ACCESS
An allocation system combining a medical priority score and a geographic feasibility score is most likely to increase equity in access without sacrificing utility; ie, ship as far as feasible to the candidates with the greatest medical need. It will therefore fulfill the require- The proposed system is most equitable to candidates on the waiting list, because it prioritizes the sickest candidates within the necessary constraints imposed by geographic feasibility. Equity is often conceptualized and measured at a group, not an individual, level, eg, candidates in California have less access to transplant than candidates in Georgia. This is often a difficult debate, because one must first agree on a metric to assess equity, eg, median time to transplant or transplant rate, and then decide which populations to compare to determine whether the system is equitable. When using a geographic feasibility score, if regional inequities were deemed unacceptable, the feasibility function may be poorly specified (are we shipping as far as feasible?) and we can modify the feasibility function to improve equity.
A framework defining mathematically optimized distribution zones differs fundamentally, because it attempts to minimize a disparity metric over groups of patients. This was how "neighborhoods" and "optimized regions" were defined for versions of the liver allocation policy considered by OPTN's Liver and Intestinal Transplantation Committee. Sharing districts were designed with the goal of reducing variation in DSA-level median MELD at transplant under constraints defined by the committee. This type of system seeks to achieve group equity, but given its necessary boundaries, it may result in bypassing candidates with greater medical need to ship organs to less urgent candidates farther away to achieve better balance between groups defined by the target metric. In contrast, the feasibility score framework starts from the standpoint of providing organs to the candidates with the greatest medical need within feasibility constraints justified under the Final Rule, without the need for geographic boundaries.
| SUMMARY
We describe an approach for developing organ allocation policies without defined geographic boundaries. Work is required to develop the feasibility score function for each organ type, eg, the ischemiaoutcomes relationship, costs, relative weightings, etc, whereas medical priority scores are already largely in place. OPTN can use the feasibility score framework to define the shape of the function and where zones A, B, and C begin and end. These decisions can be informed by research into the projected travel times between each donor hospital and each transplant program, the effect of ischemic time on organ outcomes, the costs associated with shipping organs over long distances, etc. The OPTN Board of Directors is ultimately responsible for passing any changes to organ allocation policy. If the board is asked to defend these decisions, the research used to design the shape of the function can be cited. Furthermore, reducing organ allocation to two scores, a medical priority score and a geographic feasibility score, makes future changes to the policies conceptually simple by focusing the problem on one of the two scores.
Finally, this framework clearly ties allocation policy development to the tenets set forth in the Final Rule since any decision leading to the development of the function will necessarily tie to paragraphs 121.8(a)(1)- (5) as required by the Final Rule.
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